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Hegel's apprehension of the conception of life is profound, but its depth is but little elaborated in the extent of the thousand-fold forms of nature, i.e. all morphology is omitted.

Hegel believes the earth to be the only star upon which life exists. This may easily excite surprise, and it is readily admitted that, empirically, we cannot know whether or not organic beings exist upon other stars, e.g. Venus and Mars. As a strict systematizer, however, he could not do otherwise than vindicate to the Earth this superiority. Bessel, in a treatise on the physical constitution of the world, and Whewell, in his "Plurality of Worlds," have arrived at the same result. The further conclusion that, in the entire universe, a history has been unfolded only upon the Earth, is unavoidable.

The infinite multiplicity of the heavenly bodies did not embarrass Hegel. This he regarded as a "mere" infinity which was no more imposing than the infinite multiplicity of infusoria, or insects, &c. He disapproves of the measureless admiration of natural phenomena which placed them above the productions of mind. Thus a tiny infusorium, because it was a living individual, stood infinitely higher than a constellation which is inorganic, although ever so gigantic in its mass.

INTRODUCTION TO SPECULATIVE LOGIC AND PHILOSOPHY.

By A. VERA.

CHAPTER III.

§ 1. *Preliminary Remarks to Legitimate Logic.*

We may now dismiss old Logic as artificial, arbitrary, and inadequate for the attainment of truth, and turn our attention to legitimate and rational Logic and to the principles upon which it must be firmly established.

First of all, it ought to be borne in mind that if there be a logical Science, it must be an absolute Science, or a part or division of the absolute Science. And by absolute Science, I mean a Science which inquires into, and is adequate to, the

absolute and eternal nature both of thought and things. For neither thought which is not the right thought of its object, nor the object which is not rationally thought, is science. Nor is it science if it is thought which is not an absolute, but a limited, transient, and accidental thought. Thus in dividing, defining, classifying, in deducing Ideas, or in affirming the Infinite and describing its attributes, either thought grasps and defines the inward and immutable nature of things, in which case there will be science, or it performs mental operations which are not necessarily and inwardly connected with the nature of things, in which case there will only be the shadow of science, nay, mere delusion and phantoms of the imagination.

This shows how unfounded is the division, generally admitted, of Truth into *logical* and *metaphysical* truth, a sister distinction to that we have just exploded between *Reason* and *Reasoning*. For it will be easily perceived that if Logical truth, whatever it may be, is not an absolute truth, it is no truth at all. If, on the contrary, it is an absolute truth, it possesses in its own sphere and attribution a worth and importance equal to that of Metaphysical truth—indeed it is itself a metaphysical truth. In fact, if there be an absolute Science, this Science must be Logic. All sciences presuppose Logic, whilst Logic presupposes none. All sciences avail themselves of logical processes and notions; nor could they attain their own peculiar object without bringing them into action, as it were. Even taking Logic as it now stands, it is easy to see that all sciences—Mathematics, Physics, Ontology, &c.—borrow from it a part of their own subject-matter. And by borrowing I mean this, namely, that all Sciences make, and cannot but make, Logical principles and substance (if I am allowed the expression) a part of their own substance, like the plant that borrows from surrounding elements strength and life. And as earth, air, and light, constitute an integral part of the plant's life and nature, so Logic must be considered as a necessary and essential element of all Sciences, and consequently of all Thought and Being. In fact, it would be irrational and inconsistent to admit that Logic is the universal organon of truth, that there is no being that can be apprehended or understood unless it goes

through some logical process, and to refuse at the same time to Logic all objective and consubstantial connection with the very being known through it. Indeed, if we look closely into the subject, we will perceive that, by taking this view of Logic, we admit that there are two Logical sciences, a Logic eternal and absolute, according to which things are made, arranged, and thought; and a Logic finite, accidental, and arbitrarily contrived for our special use and purpose. But then we must give up Logic—and, with Logic, Science—as useless and deceptive, and as holding out expectations it is absolutely unable to fulfil. For we use it in the expectation of attaining through it the real knowledge of things, and actually find that our knowledge has no other foundation, nor any other object, but our own transitory notion, and the negative and limited conceptions of our mind.

In order to arrive at a correct view of Logic we must, therefore, view it as a Science in the strict sense of the word, viz. as a Science of *Knowing* and *Being*, whose principles constitute at once the principles of thought and the principles of things; so that if we were, for instance, to realize it as the Science of *Form*, we should not consider the Form, as old Logic does, namely, as a merely *subjective Form*, but as a Form embracing the twofold sides of existence—the subjective and the objective, thought and the thing thought—in the unity of its nature.

§ 2. *On Science in general.*

As Logic, whatever be its importance, constitutes only a part of the Absolute, or of the Absolute Science, we cannot form a clear notion of Logic unless we give an insight into Science in general, its conditions, its bearing, and the part it plays in the constitution and the existence of the Universe.

(a) *Is there an Absolute Science?*

If there be an absolute Science, this must be the Science of the Absolute, and, *vice versa*, if there be an Absolute, there must be an absolute Science. For an Absolute without an absolute Science is no absolute, and an absolute Science without an absolute object is not an absolute Science. The absolute Science and the Absolute, the absolute thought and the absolute object of thought, are therefore reciprocally and

inseparably connected, or, to speak more properly, are the two sides of one and the same being. The question now is whether the Absolute is within the reach of the human mind; and as it is a question of vital importance, and bearing upon Logic as well as upon Science in general, I will dwell at some length upon it.

The opinion respecting the capability of the human mind to attain absolute knowledge may, I think, be divided into three heads.

First, there are those who entirely refuse to the human mind the power of reaching the Absolute. The Absolute, if it exist, they argue, is a *Deus absconditus*; it is a Being into whose ineffable and inscrutable nature no human eye can penetrate. In fact, is not man an imperfect and finite being? How, then, could he comprehend the Perfect and the Infinite?

Secondly, there are others who steer an intermediate course. These do not say that we are refused all knowledge of the Absolute, but that our knowledge does not extend beyond its existence. We know that the Absolute *is*, but we are not allowed to know *what* it is, and to have an insight into its nature, its attributes and perfections.

Finally, others go one step farther, and admit that we are capable of apprehending both its existence and some of its attributes, as, for instance, that it is Infinite, All-powerful, All-wise, &c., without being able to reach the very length, the essence of its nature, nor to determine clearly and in a *positive* manner what these attributes are; and consequently, according to this tenet, we would know that the Absolute is All-wise, Omnipotent, &c., without comprehending *what* omnipotence, all-wisdom, &c., are.

Although these doctrines seem, at first sight, to stand on different bases, and to represent different opinions, they start in reality from the same point of view—the inadequacy of the human mind for the attainment of absolute knowledge; and lead to the same result—the negation of Science, or Skepticism. Indeed the two latter, though apparently more comprehensive and more condescending, as it were, towards the human mind, labor, when compared with the former, under the disadvantage of inconsistency; and the third, which seems to conciliate matters and to hit upon the right solu-

tion is the most inconsistent of the two. In fact there is no inconsistency in affirming that man's mind is utterly inadequate for absolute knowledge. There may be error, but there is no inconsistency; whilst in the other two opinions error is coupled with inconsistency, as they state both, and the latter more explicitly than the second, that man can reach the Absolute, and then they take up, so to speak, the opposite thesis, in the same proposition, and state that he is unable to reach it; and although the inconsistency does not appear in the expression, it is not the less involved in the real meaning.

The second doctrine teaches that we are allowed to know that God *is*, but we are forbidden to advance a step farther. If we were to trace the origin of this doctrine, we should find that it arises from a superficial view of the subject, and from an application equally superficial and erroneous of the analogical and inductive process to absolute knowledge. Here is a tree, or an animal, or myself. As I can affirm that a tree *is*, or that I *am*, without knowing the nature of the tree or my own, so likewise can I affirm that God *is*, although I may be unable to comprehend His attributes and nature.

Now this manner of arguing is erroneous and deceptive even within the sphere of experimental perception. For the perception of the existence of all objects which come within the pale of experience is inseparable from the perception of some of their qualities; as, for instance, that the tree occupies a portion of space; that it has color, leaves, &c.; and its existence is made known to me through some of these qualities. Nor am I conscious of my existence save by apprehending myself either as a thinking, or as an active, or as a sensitive being. Now this connection between the existence and the attributes of a being is still more intimate and inseparable in God. For when we say that God *is*, we do not mean that He *is* like anything finite, or falling under the senses, but that He *is* in such a manner as is conformable with the perfection of His nature. Consequently, the affirmation of the existence of God involves already the apprehension of the *manner* in which God exists, that is to say, of a part or aspect of the Divine nature. Besides, when we state that *God is*, either the word *God* is a mere word, an empty sound, and then the proposition means nothing; or it has a meaning,

and then it means that the *Absolute*, or the *Perfect Being*, or the *Ens realissimum*, etc., *is*; i.e. it expresses some essential and necessary attribute of the nature of God. In fact, in God the *Esse essentialæ* and the *Esse existentia*, to use the expression of Schoolmen, are more intimately blended than in finite beings; so that in God *to be* and *to be such* is one and the same thing. Nor could He *be* if He might be otherwise than He is, and, *vice versa*, were He otherwise than He is, He could not be. Consequently, to apprehend that God *is*, is to apprehend, in a certain manner, *what* He is; and to pretend that we can apprehend that God is, and then to say that we are not allowed to know what He is, is to deny in the second part of the proposition what we have admitted in the first.

With respect to the third doctrine, it will be easily seen that it is still more inconsistent and arbitrary; for it states that we are allowed to apprehend a part only of the Absolute, and then it adds that even this part is known to us *negatively*; which means, in reality, that we do not know it at all.

With regard to the first part of the proposition, namely, that we know, or are capable of knowing, a portion, a certain number of the attributes of the Absolute, but not the whole of His nature,—it will be observed that those who hold this doctrine break asunder artificially and arbitrarily the unity of the Absolute, and, after having thus disfigured, nay, annulled the absolute, say, this part of the absolute we can know, and this other part we are not allowed to know. But how can they say that there is a part, a sphere in the absolute which is beyond the reach of the mind, if the mind has no notion of it? If, on the contrary, the mind has some notion of it, how can they say that it is beyond the reach of the mind? Besides, is it not one and the same mind that apprehends in the one and the same absolute both the part which is known and that which is supposed to be unknown? If so, how could I affirm that the part supposed unknown in the absolute belongs really to the absolute, and constitutes the highest sphere of its nature and existence, if I have not actually, or am not allowed to have, any knowledge of it? The fact is that the absolute cannot be so dismembered; for, such is the unity of its nature, that of the Absolute, more

than any of other being, it may be truly said, that, if we cannot know all, we can know nothing of it.

But even granted that it would be rational to admit that we know only a part of the Absolute,—if the knowledge we possess of it is merely a *negative* one, such a knowledge is, in reality, no knowledge at all. In fact, to possess a *negative* knowledge of a thing, is not to know what *this thing is*, but what *it is not*. For instance, to have a *negative* knowledge of the *triangle* is not to know what the *triangle* is, but that the *triangle* is not a *square*; or to have a *negative* knowledge of a *tree* is not to know what the *tree* is, but that the *tree* is not a *mountain*; or to have a *negative knowledge* of the *good* is not to know what the *good* is, but that the *good* is neither the *evil*, nor the *beautiful*, nor any other thing. This manner of arguing seems, at first sight, quite plausible; for although I do not know, one would say, what a man is doing at the present moment, yet this I perfectly know, that he is neither writing, nor reading, nor sleeping, &c. All the strength of the argument lies in the assumption that we are able to know what a thing *is not* without knowing in any way what it is. Now it is quite plain that we cannot state what a thing is not unless we know in some manner what it is—unless, in other words, we possess some *positive* knowledge of it. For I must know in a *positive* manner what a man is to affirm that he is neither writing nor sleeping, &c.; nay, I must know that writing and sleeping are parts of his nature. And this connection of positive and negative knowledge is still more inseparable in matters eternal and absolute. To say that the Infinite is not the Finite requires that I should have some positive notion of what the Infinite is. And it is by comparing the positive notion of the Infinite with the Finite that I am enabled to draw the conclusion that the former is not the latter. Had I not some positive notion of the Infinite I could neither affirm that the Infinite *is*, nor that *it is* or *is not* in such and such a manner.

The fact is that we cannot consistently conceive two Sciences, an absolute science and a science which is not absolute—not any more than we can admit two Reasons, the human Reason and the Divine Reason, as substantially distinct. For by admitting two Reasons we would not only

admit that one Reason knows what the other does not know—a difference which exists within the limits of the human Reason and between man and man—but that what is knowledge and truth to the one is not, or may not be, knowledge and truth to the other. For if the Reason which apprehends mathematical or any other truth, in man, is not the Reason which apprehends the same truth in God, or if the Reason by which man apprehends God is of a different genus and substance from that by which God apprehends himself, all human knowledge is a mere delusion. Indeed all relation between God and man is at an end if God's and man's Reason does not flow from one and the same principle. And this would strike at the very root not only of Science but of Revelation also; as where there is not a community of nature, some identical faculty between the master and the disciple, there can be no teaching possible, let this take place either through an inward inspiration from mind to mind, or by word of mouth. Therefore the only solution of the problem—the solution which alone will be found, upon an impartial and close examination, consistent with science, religion and truth—is that the divine and the human reason, springing from one and the same source, are, as to their essence, one and the same reason.*

(b) *Nature and Characteristics of Science.*

To the uncultivated and unscientific mind Science appears as an accident, and a kind of superfluous luxury which is not required by any inward want or necessity of human nature. This is the point of view of purely sensitive life belonging to the undeveloped and elementary stage of existence, either national or individual—to what we might call the state of childhood and nature. Here the satisfaction of physical wants appears as the law of life. For, to quote the argument in its popular and crude form, there is necessity in eating and drinking, and in removing all unpleasurable sensation; but there is no necessity in learning.

However, man soon feels that physical life is not the supreme object of his existence, that there are wants of a higher order and more cognate with his own nature than physical

* See also on this question my book, lately published, "The Problem of the Absolute."

wants, and that the satisfaction of the former is a duty as imperative, nay, more imperative, than the satisfaction of the latter. For it is this that makes him what he is, a being who by his mind holds sway over the inanimate and brute creation, adapting it to his spiritual as well as to his material wants, elevating thereby the latter to a higher dignity, and imparting to them such beauty and perfection as they would never have possessed had not the mind stamped them with its own perfection. Here man acknowledges Science and reverences it. He acknowledges that Science is an object of paramount importance either as a moral and intellectual necessity, or as a source of the purest enjoyment, or as a means of conquering the blind and unruly forces of Nature. Now this acknowledgment is nothing else than the actual expression and manifestation of the *idea* of Science. In fact, the idea or notion of Science is, like the ideas of the Infinite, of the Beautiful, of Justice, of Number, &c., a primitive, objective, and necessary attribute of the mind; or, more exactly, it is a notion that springs from its very essence, and is more intimately inherent in it than any other notion, principle, or law. For it may be truly said that the mind is more absolutely and more irresistibly attracted towards Science than matter towards its centre; as a mind not possessing any desire for knowledge would be a sort of *contradictio in terminis*—it would be a mind which is not a mind, an understanding which is not an understanding. But this desire for knowledge, this inward and inextinguishable longing after truth, is nothing but a movement of the Intellect towards its natural object and nourishment, stimulated, as the Intellect is, by this very Idea of Science; so much so, that were the Idea erased from the Intellect, the longing also would thereby be extinguished.

If it be so, if Science rests on a primary notion or law of the mind, to determine the nature and essence of Science we have only to describe the essential feature and characteristics of this same notion.

First of all, the notion of Science and the notion of absolute Science are inseparable, or, more accurately speaking, are one and the same notion. All relative and finite knowledge conceals under various forms, and more or less visibly,

an infinite knowledge, from which it emanates and with which it is connected by necessary and inward bonds. Thus it may be truly said that the natural and predominant aspiration of the mind is not towards limited but absolute knowledge—an aspiration that rises with the rising of our intellectual activity. That world-embracing curiosity, that vague but profound and ardent desire for universal knowledge which is fermenting as it were in the innermost recess of our soul, is nothing else than the aspiration, still obscure and indefinite, after absolute science, of which subsequent inquiries are the greatest satisfaction and actual realization. This aspiration, or want, or whatever it be called, may be traced in every mind; and the only difference between them in this respect is the difference arising from the various degrees of their development, or from the influence which external and accidental causes—moral, social, and physical—exercise upon this development either to promote or to impede it, as well as from their application to the multifarious objects of knowledge and practical activity. And if we closely examine into the nature of beings, and the constitution of the Universe, such differences, far from surprising us, will appear as a necessary condition of this existence. Thus all men virtually possess the same faculties and instincts, all are endowed with the same natural aptitude for all social functions. But the unity of the Universe as well as the unity of human nature is divided into particular and individual beings, and split as it were into fragments; the necessary consequence of which division is that in some beauty, in others morality, most predominates; that one is possessed of a peculiar aptitude for mechanical labor, and another for some liberal or intellectual avocation. So it is with science. There is but one Science, as there is but one Intellect; and particular sciences constitute as many degrees, or stages, of the absolute Science. They are so many radii that spring from a central focus, from which they derive life, light, and nourishment. The natural philosopher who studies matter and its laws well knows that his investigations and results possess but a limited and relative importance, and are subordinate to a superior knowledge, where their justification and ultimate reason are only to be found. He knows it, or he ought to

know it. And if he be not aware of it—if, in consequence of a defective intellectual training he concentrates his attention and inquiries within the limited sphere of nature, seeking in it the ultimate solution of the problem of science, he is certainly mistaken in seeking the centre of knowledge where it is not to be found. Yet he thereby explicitly acknowledges that there is such a centre; he acknowledges, in other words, the existence and necessity of an absolute Science, and it is such a science he endeavors to realize. And so it would be with Mathematics and with any limited science that would set itself up as the ruling power of Intellect and as the Science of sciences. This high pretension would not be in keeping with the limited object of this investigation, but this would, at the same time, bear testimony to the existence of a higher object and a higher visual power than their own. Science and absolute Science are therefore, in the strict sense of the word, identical, and particular sciences are only sciences, inasmuch as they are parts of the absolute Science, coincide with, and are justified by it. Now, as there cannot be two Sciences, the second essential character of the really scientific knowledge is *unity*. The unity of Science is not the mathematical or *quantitative* unity, but the higher and *absolute* unity of *qualities* and *essences*, something like the unity of the human body, or the unity of the Universe*; namely, a whole in which the various qualities and essences, the conflicting elements, forces, and principles, are so harmoniously adjusted as to converge towards one and the same centre, and melt, as it were, into a common result; in other words, Science is essentially a *System*.

There are those who object to systematic knowledge on the plea that a system, i.e. a doctrine, which would be, so to

* This is an important distinction; for, misled by mathematical notions, we are apt to represent to ourselves the unity of things as an empty and abstract mathematical unity. But the unity of *force*, the unity of the *soul*, the unity of *God*, are neither *points* nor *numbers*, but are indivisible wholes, containing *quality* and *quantity* as well as the various attributes that constitute their nature. When we say that the soul is—that it possesses sensibility, will, intellect, &c., we *count* its attributes, and in this respect there is *quantity* in it; but the connection or unity of these *faculties* and *qualities* is not a *numerical* but an *essential* unity—the unity of the essence of the soul. Besides the unity of thought that *thinks*, and *is* all things, cannot be the mathematical unit. (See below ¶ 3. On *Thought*.)

speaking, the reflex of the Universe, embracing the universality of things, deducing and connecting them according to some rational process, describing their properties and nature, and determining the part they play either within their own limited sphere or in their relation to the whole, is well nigh, if not wholly, impossible. But the difficulty, however great it may be, we meet with in the realization of a scheme, is not a test against its rationality and usefulness; and because it is not an easy matter to realize a system, it does in no way follow that we must not make the attempt, if Science be, as it evidently is, a system. On the contrary, the consequence to be naturally drawn therefrom is, that the more systematic the investigation, the more accurate and complete the result. And it ought to be borne in mind, that the difficulty we find in realizing a perfect system may be said to beset all knowledge, the knowledge of the most rudimentary and minute object—of a pebble, of an insect—so that this argument belongs to the category of those which overshoot the mark, or, as logicians say, proving too much prove nothing. Indeed, if the matter be attentively inquired into, it will be seen that the difficulty in explaining the nature of particular beings chiefly arises from the absence of systematic knowledge, which precludes the mind from perceiving their connection with collateral beings and with the whole. For the part thus singled out and dis severed from the whole is not the same being as when connected with the whole. The eye which is separated from the body is no longer an eye but a dead and useless object; and the dissection and analysis of the anatomist, however careful and minute, is unable to reproduce the real eye, the eye that was in union with the whole organism, with life, with the mind, and through the mind with the Universe. The leaf which has fallen from the tree has ceased to be a leaf; and if we continue to call it so, it is from the remembrance of its former connection with the whole plant. But as soon as this connection is broken, its growth, its beauty, and all its other functions and purposes, are broken also. Thus it is with Science. Science which disconnects and scatters knowledge, and breaks asunder the unity of things—the golden chain from which the Universe is suspended—converts a full, concrete and living being into

an unmeaning, lifeless and purposeless object. Moreover, by admitting that Science is not a system, we admit that knowledge may be gathered at random, and that we are able to obtain it without deducing and disposing our thoughts and inquiries according to their natural and necessary connection—an opinion contradictory to the very notion of science, as well as to the universal nature of things, since nothing can either be rationally thought or exist which is not a system. The beauty, the proportion, the unity, we admire in the Universe is nothing else than a systematic arrangement—an arrangement which is not confined to the general outline and to the framework of the structure, but extends to all its parts and penetrates into its most minute details, thus filling alike the intellect and the imagination with wonder and delight. This applies equally to Science; for, whether Science be considered as the representation of the Universe, or the Universe as the representation of Science, the conclusion to be drawn, in either supposition, is that knowledge must be a system, and consequently that where there is no system there must be error, confusion, a medley of inordinate and irreconcilable elements. For to gather knowledge unsystematically is either to take up questions, notions and principles at random, without defining their nature, meaning and bearing,* or to consider a part as if it were a whole,† or the whole as if

* Thus it is, for instance, that we use the notion *infinite*, applying it indiscriminately to different objects, and saying that *God is infinite*; that *Space is infinite*; that *Number, Beauty, &c.* are *infinite*, without inquiring what an *infinite* being is or can be, nor how these various objects can be *infinite*. We deal in the same manner with other notions, and the most important, as *God, Force, Being, Object, &c.* For instance, we say, *God is a Being, Man is a Being, the Plant is a Being*, without inquiring into the meaning involved in the notion *Being*, or if it is the same notion which is applied to these different objects, and, if the same, how it can be applied to them.

† This is the way in which the different parts of Science are generally handled: Logic, Metaphysics, Ethics, Psychology, Art, Religion, &c., are considered irrespectively of each other, and as if each of them constituted a whole. And within the province of each separate branch of knowledge, particular subjects are handled in the same manner. Hence exclusive, one-sided theories, as, for instance, in Psychological Science, the theory that deduces the whole mind from sensation; in Morals, the theories which identify all motives either with pleasure or with interest; in Art, the theories that concentrate beauty either in *form* or in *expression*; in Politics, all theories which, instead of embracing the various wants, tendencies and interests of the social body, single out some particular want or principle, and violently merge, as it were, the whole body politic into it.

it had no parts and could exist without them;* or to bring together things irreconcilable, and to separate things necessarily connected; or to confound things that are distinct by mixing their provinces, and forcing the nature of one upon that of the other;† or to admit or deny in a certain form the the very same things, that had been denied or admitted in another.‡

We say, then, that absolute Science is *one*, and that it is one as a system.

But to know in the absolute sense of the word is not only to *think* and to *apprehend*, but to *be* the object of knowledge. In fact Science is neither *Thought* without *Being*, nor *Being* without *Thought*, as neither *Thought* which involves no real object, nor any real object which is not thought, constitute Science. Science is therefore the unity of thought and being—the object thought—or it is *Thought par excellence*, thought

* When, for instance, we say that the *cause* is perfect without its *effect*, or the *substance* without its *accidences*. Under the same head may be ranged those doctrines which strip a substance or a principle of its attributes, modes, or qualities—matter, for instance, of color, form, weight, &c.—the soul of sensibility, will, imagination, &c.—which they consider as *non-essential*, pretending that matter or the soul could exist without them; just as, in another province, some politicians would banish force, inequality, war from the State, which they consider as *unessential* elements of social life.

† This is one of the most common errors, as it is difficult to draw an exact line of demarcation between the various beings and spheres of existence. Thus it is that we transfer from one being or from one province of knowledge or existence to another the qualities, laws, and attributes, which belong only to the former. In this respect the inductive and analogical processes are the greatest source of inadvertencies and misconceptions.

‡ This inadvertency may be frequently observed in common life, where men will admit the very same proposal, opinion, and principle, they had formerly rejected, and which they would still reject unless it were put to them in a different form. Instances of the same error are not uncommon in science and in the most important questions. For instance, there are doctrines which draw an absolute separation between the substance of God and the substance of the world, and then when they come to determine the nature and attributes of the Godhead they realize them in conformity with our own, assigning to God our own faculties—a Personality, a Consciousness, a mode of loving and governing the world modelled upon our own corresponding attributes; so much so, that, according to this manner of viewing the subject, the popular dictum, that *man is made in the image of God*, ought to be reversed, and said that *God is made in the image of Man*. It will be observed that formal Logic is unable to supply any rule or criterion by the aid of which the mind could guard against these or other similar errors, as it is only by inquiring into the *matter* and objective nature of things that they can be discovered and avoided.

which is become adequate to its object, and in the nature of which the object has been so merged and absorbed as to make one and the same thing. The unity of the Universe is not to be found in the absolute *Being*, or in the absolute *Substance*, but in the absolute *Thought* and *Knowledge* in which the *Being* and the *Substance* as well as all other principles are involved, and attain their highest and fullest existence. *Being* and *Substance* without Science are like the body without the mind, or Nature without the Spirit.

We say, then, that *to know* is *to be*, and I will add that it is *to be* in the fullest acceptation of the word. The difficulty we find in perceiving the truth and importance of this principle is mainly due to a deficiency in the training of our speculative faculty, which keeps our mind within the bounds of sensation, of experience and induction, and conceals from its sight other and higher realities—realities without which experience itself, and all things appertaining to it, could neither exist nor be apprehended. In fact, if we start from experience,—holding it as the criterion of reality, the identity of *knowing* and *being*, is, I admit, inconceivable. For to apprehend a tree is not *to be* a tree, and to apprehend the fire is not *to be* the fire and to burn; so that here thought and its object are beings distinct and separable. But if we admit, as we must admit, that besides and above the visible and experimental there is an invisible and transcendent Reality, that this latter Reality is the principle of the former, and that, being beyond the reach of the senses, it can only be apprehended by pure thought—by thought freed from sensation and all experimental elements—the difficulty will be more easily solved.

To elucidate this point, let us consider the two propositions, *God is—This flower is*. Here, deceived by the identity of the word *is*, and by the habit of picturing to ourselves all reality in a material and sensible form, we apply to the word the same meaning in both instances, and thus are led to realize the *Being* of God as the *Being* of a flower or of any other object falling under the senses. Now, it may be easily perceived that the meaning involved in the *is* of the one proposition is entirely different, nay, the reverse of that which is involved in the *is* of the other. For the *Being* or the *to Be*

of God is not the *Being* of the flower, and were we to conceive His Being in any manner similar to that of an external and phenomenal object, not only would we distort but suppress at once the notion and existence of God. Consequently, when we say that God *is*, we mean, if we mean anything, that He *is* in a purely *intelligible* and *ideal* manner, and that He can be apprehended through that faculty which alone is able to reach the eternal and the absolute, by whatever name it be designated, whether it be called *Reason*, or *Intellect*, or *Speculative Thought*. Whence it follows also that the existence of God is quite the reverse of the existence of finite and phenomenal beings, and that, in order to form a correct notion of Him, we must strive to remove from our mind all trace of experience, and set its visual power, so to speak, in antagonism with it. And these considerations not only apply to God, but to all principles, causes, and essences. For neither God, nor any principle whatever, can be apprehended through experimental process, and it is only by a fallacy and delusion of the inductive method that we are led to believe that metaphysical science can be founded on experimental knowledge; it is from inconsistency, and by leaping over instead of filling up the gap—nay, by tacitly and unwittingly presupposing the very notion and principle it professes to draw from its operation—that experimental method concludes the infinite and eternal from the finite and temporal. Were it consistent, as phenomena, facts, effects—all, in one word, that comes within the pale of experience is changeable and perishable—the conclusion ought to be that principles, causes, and essences, are changeable and perishable also. Thus, for instance, as *motion*, *force*, *light*, *heat*, &c., when *considered* in particular phenomena, are continually perishing and reviving, the inference would be that the principles of these phenomena are subject to the same alternate movement of destruction and revival; or that the cause, whatever it be, that produces man is mortal, because man is mortal—and similar examples—which would be simply absurd, as nothing could be, nor be restored to life when destroyed, if its principles were liable either to alteration or destruction. Accordingly, the nature and knowledge—the Being and Knowing—of principles and essences, differ from the nature

and knowledge of their products—facts, phenomena, effects. And if we contrast the former with the latter we shall see, 1°. that, for the very reason that the former are the creative essences of things, their nature remains unimpaired and undiminished in the begetting of them; 2°. that they possess a *purely ideal and intelligible* nature,—indeed they are *ideas*, as we will see hereafter, and as such they cannot be *felt*, or brought within any sensuous shape, or any point of time and space, but only be apprehended by pure thought; 3°. that, from their being creative essences, they produce the effect without mingling their eternal and impassible nature with it, like the hand, or, still more truly, like the mind, that produces the work without being reacted upon by it and receiving the imprint of it; thus it is that Death destroys without destroying itself, and fire burns without burning itself out;* and 4°. that, because of their possessing a *pure* and *intelligible* nature, thought can think them in their intelligible existence—thinking the fire, for instance, the light, the air, as well as the Good, the Beautiful, &c., and when thinking them in their objective and essential nature, being the fire, the light, &c., &c., and keeping clear at the same time from their effects.

§ 3. On Thought.

This will be better understood if we give a deeper insight into the nature of Thought, of Science, and their eternal and inseparable object—namely, Ideas, and the relation in which they stand to each other.

To know is to think, and it is to think in the highest sense of the word. Now thought is not only the faculty from whose inexhaustible depths springs all knowledge, but it constitutes also the highest essence and the culminating point of existence. The old adage that man is a microcosm has only a meaning when applied to thought. For thought alone possesses the privilege, shared by no other faculty or being, of thinking itself and all other things, and of thinking them as within itself, and as objects not only cognate to, but identical with, its own nature. There is no being, whatever be its

* This elucidates the theory of the *First mover* of Aristotle, namely, of the Mover who moves All without moving itself, or being moved.

nature and properties, there is no point of space, actually or possibly, without the reach of thought. The infinite and the finite, the invisible and the visible world, the numberless variety of beings with their numberless qualities, difference and opposition, all equally meet in the depths of thought as in their common centre. Indeed it is in thought that the Universe attains its highest perfection. The external world, by being thought and in thought, is made partaker of a dignity, beauty, and perfection, it does not possess in itself. For it is *within* the mind that Nature attains its ideal and essential existence, whilst *without* the mind Nature's existence is fragmentary, scattered, destitute of inward bond or unity. It is an external juxtaposition of beings unconscious of themselves as well as of their mutual connection. Nor can we conceive, either in God or in man, anything more excellent than thought. Indeed it constitutes in both the very excellence of their nature.* In man, his whole being, so to speak, supposes thought, and is thought. Take away thought from him and he ceases to be what he is, the most wonderful amongst created beings, and he will find himself lowered to the level of the brute and inanimate creation. All his activity, internal as well as external, flows from thought; and there is no manifestation of it, from the most profound researches and the highest soarings of imagination to the most humble occupation, in which thought stands not foremost and is not the motive power of action. Will, imagination, memory, self-consciousness, and even the faculty that stands, as it were, on the limit of the physical and the spiritual worlds, of the body and soul—Sensation I mean—are not merely impelled by thought, but thought is their essential element—nay, they

* As far as we can conceive God. But this must not be lost sight of, namely, that God, like all other things, is only known to us through thought, and that beyond thought His being is for us = 0. It is one of the popular inadvertencies to believe that we can reach God through any other faculty—*sentiment. intuition*, or whatever be its name—but thought, although sentiment and intuition are only inferior forms of thought, or thought which is still mixed with sensation, and unable to perceive truth in its pure essence. We possess the sentiment of God as we possess the sentiment of ourselves, of mathematical truth, and of all things in general—which sentiment is a dim perception of these objects, or confused and imperfect thought, involving inconsistencies and delusion, a mixture of light and shade, of truth and error.

are different forms or instruments of thought. For there is thought in *Sensation* as well as in any other faculty and mental operation, and not only is it through thought that sensation is inwardly felt by the soul, but the external object that produces sensation is likewise apprehended by it. Thought constitutes, therefore, the unity of the human being, of mind and body, and of their connection with the universe*; and if it constitutes the highest essence and perfection, it follows that everything is made for it and is subordinate to it; that it is thought that will impart light, vigor and life to individuals as well as nations, and that where the internal activity of thought is declining there the external also will languish or become extinct. Such is thought, the most stupendous of beings! In the presence of Nature, before the huge masses that move in space, the vast expanse of the water, the sun and the planets, and the bodies innumerable with which the vault of heaven is studded, we are struck with wonder and awe. How much more will thought appear worthy of our admiration if we bear in mind, that not only these objects but the Universe is concentrated in thought,

* Those who place this unity in the brain as the centre of the nervous system, or those who *localize* the soul by assigning it a particular place, either in the brain, like Descartes (*glandula pinealis*), or in any other part of the body, are deceived by external and sensuous representation which lead them to assimilate the unity of the soul to something like the spider feeling in the centre of the cobweb the insect that skims over its threads. But quite different is the unity of the human being. Here the centre is everywhere and nowhere; and the sensation is not felt in a central point, but all over the body and in every part of it. Moreover, all sensation, however different and opposite—as the sensation of pain and pleasure, of light and darkness, of heat and cold, &c.—may be compared and brought into a unity, though felt by different senses and in different parts of the body. From the fact that we feel thinking in the brain, and that the more intense is thought, the more it seems to concentrate itself in this part of the body, it does not follow that thought has its seat in the brain, and much less that the brain is the faculty of thinking, but merely that the brain is the *main* instrument of thought, as the eye is the instrument of vision and the ear of hearing. I say the *main*; for all the senses and organs of the body are instruments of thought, as it is not the eye that *sees*, nor the ear that *hears*, but it is thought that sees and hears through the instrumentality of the organ. Besides, any theory attempting to explain the unity and nature of thought, or the unity and nature of the human being, by some organic function or arrangement, will run aground not only against abstract and speculative arguments, but against experience itself. For it is a fact that thought apprehends the infinite, the eternal, and the absolute, and consequently cannot be circumscribed within the bounds of corporeal organs.

and that the ultimate reason of all that exists and will exist is apprehended by thought, and is thought! For thought that constitutes the excellence of the human, constitutes also the excellence of the divine nature. God is the absolute and eternal thought. This is the highest definition of God, His preëminent attribute and perfection. The omnipotence, the love, the providence, as well as the goodness and justice of God are subordinate attributes and modes of His Being. All presuppose thought, and it is by coming, as it were, in contact with thought, that they attain their highest power and perfection. Thus the love of God is the thought of the eternal ideas which are His perfection, a love embracing the love of Himself and the love of the external manifestation of ideas, or the World; which shows that the love of God towards the world cannot be love towards individuals, nor even towards nations, but towards the Whole, and that the parts are only loved by God inasmuch as they harmonize with the Whole, and contribute to its preservation and the fulfilment of the law, which is the eternal thought of God. And thus it is that what is wisdom and love in the sight of man may be foolishness and hatred in the sight of God. This applies also to His Providence. The providence of God is His eternal and immutable thought, which is the law out of and according to which all things are made and governed. The government of the World is implied in the very essence of things, as everything must be made and governed according to its special essence. Therefore to *think* is in God to *govern* and to *foresee*, and to *govern through* and to *foresee* in the immutable essence of things. This is the rational notion of the Providence and Prescience of God, the only notion in conformity with the majesty and excellence of His nature. To realize God as actually foreseeing and regulating all single and daily events, all transient phenomena and accidents, is to degrade and lower Him to the level of finite beings.

NOTE.—The popular doctrine is that God not only governs the world through general laws, but that His Providence extends to all particular events, and to the minutest details of this vast and wonderful machinery. For it is agreed, if there were events—nay, one single event—that should not be predetermined by God, God's Providence would not embrace all things, and consequently God would not be All-powerful, which is contradictory to the notion of the Deity. The same

argument applies to His Prescience. Those who rest their doctrine on this and similar arguments do not perceive that they fall, and still more deeply, into the difficulty they pretend to avoid; for against this mode of arguing it may be retorted, that if it be contradictory to the notion of God that God's Providence should not embrace all things, it is much more at variance with the whole of His nature that He who is the Absolute and Perfect Being should busy Himself with individual beings and particular and transitory events, however unworthy they may be of His providential care. But we deal with God in a more off-hand way than we are wont to do with our fellow-creatures. For we would think it derogatory in the sovereign to descend from his high station and perform menial or inferior duties, or in the judge to carry out with his own hands the prescription of the law; but with God we are not so considerate and reverential, and He must have a hand in all our daily affairs, no matter how irreconcilable they may be with His majesty and perfections. And this is done to shield Him, as it were, from imperfection, and to describe Him in the fulness of His nature and existence! The fact is that such representation of God is sheer anthropomorphism; nay, it is the heathenish conception of the Deity, glossed over with a kind of nominal Spiritualism. For, in reality, we make Him love, foresee, and govern, as we do love, foresee, and govern; and we force upon Him what we call our Personality and Consciousness, adding, it is true, that all such attributes and faculties are *infinite* in Him, but taking care, at the same time, not to state what an *infinite* Love, an *infinite* Providence, an *infinite* Personality is or can be. In fact, if the matter were more closely gone into, it would become manifest that an *infinite* love, an *infinite* personality, &c., are mere vain and empty words, calculated only to mislead the mind, if we realize God's love and personality like man's. The heathenish representation of God would then be at least more consistent. For if love in God be what love in man is, God must love as man does; and if God's government of the Universe be what man's government is, Jupiter must convene his council in Olympus as Agamemnon in the camp, and frown when in anger, and drink and eat as man does when impelled by thirst and hunger, except that he will partake of some unknown and immortal nourishment. And what is still stranger in the matter is, that if any one come forward and suggest that these and the like representations of God—namely, all representations drawn from experience, analogy, and induction—are not only inadequate, but fallacious and at variance with the very nature of God; and that the only way by which we can form a correct and true notion of the Deity is through purely intellectual and speculative processes, as God is not only a Being that no experimental process can reach, but rather the reverse of all we know through experience;—if any one, I say, come forward and hold such a doctrine, some will object that they do not understand it, and that it is too subtle for their perception; others, that they have neither leisure nor taste for such inquiries; and that they rest satisfied with the popular and current notions on the matter; and finally, others, that all speculation is the delusion of a visionary brain that mistakes its own phantoms for realities, not unfrequently exciting against it popular ignorance and prejudice by branding it with the name of Pantheism, of Atheism and Infidelity. Surely, if there be Atheism and Infidelity, all doctrine that inculcates an irrational and erroneous notion of the Godhead deserves such a name; and if there be Pantheism, the doctrine that teaches that God predetermines and foresees everything, and that there is not a single event in which God has not a share, is Pantheism of the coarsest description. That God is All, and that all things are in God, is a sound—nay, it is the only rational doctrine. For all things must come from God, if they do not come from nought; but if they come

from God, were they even created *ex nihilo*, there must be something of God—a spark of the divine essence—in them. Consequently, those who hold that God is in the World, and that the World is in God, hold a rational tenet. In fact, this parental connexion of God with the World is that which, on the one hand, imparts to the World and to everything that is in it whatever being and perfection they possess, and which, on the other hand, completes, as it were, the perfection of God Himself. For if we separate, substantially and absolutely, God and the World, we do not only impair and curtail the being of the World but that of God also. We curtail the being of the World, by separating it from its principle; we curtail the being of God, by admitting that the substance of the World is independent of God, and, consequently, by admitting *two absolute substances*. And the *creatio ex nihilo* would not fill up the gap, as the *creatio ex nihilo* could not affect the principles and essences of things, which under any supposition, must be coeternal with God. But if God be All, He is not so in the sense that He is every individual being and every single phenomenon—so that if I am joyful or sorrowful He should rejoice and grieve with me, or that He should be the insect that crawls or the seed that grows upon the earth—but in the sense that He is the principle of all things, and that all things find their ultimate reason, their essence, in Him. Thus, being the principle, He is not what the thing is of which He is the principle. And, being *All* in this high sense of the word, He is not what the individual and fragmentary part is. It is because joy and sorrow, as well as life and death, come from Him, that He does neither rejoice nor grieve, neither come to life nor end in death. For should He come to life or end in death He could give neither life nor death; and if He felt joy and sorrow as we do He could be the principle of neither, as they would be sent to Him as they are sent to us. Besides, being All and the Absolute, He is liable neither to want, nor loss, nor to any increase of perfections, which are the conditions of joy and sorrow and of all similar modifications and changes through which the finite and mortal being must pass. Again, the seed that *becomes* and the seed that *is* (the essence) are two different seeds. The former we see and touch, the latter we think only. But that which we think only, is eternal and immortal. God is the *Thought*, the *Idea*, the *Essence* of the Universe—this is the highest and absolute definition of God, a definition in which are comprised His Providence, His Love, His Power, and all His perfections. For the Thought of God is the Providence of things, and, for the very reason it is the essence, it is the Providence of each being particularly. The Providence of the plant is its *idea*, according to which it is born, it grows and dies. And so it is with everything. And, knowing and being the *idea*, God need not extend His care to individual beings, as not only the knowledge and being of the latter are involved in the knowledge and being of the former, but they find in the former their highest and perfect existence. Thus, for instance, in the knowledge and being of the ideal triangle are comprised all material triangles, whatever be their size, form, and position, as in the knowledge and being of the ideal man—genus or species—are involved the knowledge and being of all men. Consequently, it must be laid down as a fundamental principle of metaphysical science that God is in the World, and that He is not in the World; that He is *All* things in their *idea*, and as a Whole, and in the Unity of their existence; and that He is not All things individually, or in their particular and fragmentary existence.